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Abstract. In this second and last paper of the two part investigation on “Modality and Axiomatic
Theories of Truth” we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic
theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman. This general strategy was developed in the first part
of our investigation. Applying the strategy to Kripke-Feferman leads to the theory Modal Kripke-
Feferman which we discuss from the three perspectives that we had already considered in the first
paper, where we discussed the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. That is, we first show that Modal
Kripke-Feferman preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic.
Second, we develop a modal semantics fitting the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate
whether the modal predicate of Modal Kripke-Feferman can be understood along the lines of a
proposal of Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator.
§1. Introduction. This paper is the second of two papers in which we explore
a general strategy for constructing modal theories where the modal notion is conceived
as a predicate. In the first paper “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I: Friedman-
Sheard” we outlined the general strategy and applied it to the axiomatic theory of truth
Friedman-Sheard. This led to the development and the investigation of the theory Modal
Friedman-Sheard and a corresponding semantics, modal revision semantics. The basic idea
of the strategy is to characterize the modal predicate by its interaction with the truth predi-
cate. This allows us to analyze the modal paradoxes as manifestations of the paradoxicality
of the concept of truth. In this paper we continue testing our strategy by applying it to an
alternative theory of truth, namely Kripke-Feferman.
Testing our strategy with respect to the axiomatic theory of truth Kripke-Feferman is
interesting from several perspectives. First, the theory Kripke-Feferman is a well accepted
theory of truth and considered by many to be one of the philosophically more attractive
theories available. Therefore, a modal theory which is based on this very theory of truth
seems to be philosophically promising. Second, the theories of truth Friedman-Sheard and
Kripke-Feferman are very different in character: Friedman-Sheard is a symmetric theory of
truth which, on the downside, is ω-inconsistent. Kripke-Feferman is a nonsymmetric theory
of truth (i.e., the inner and the outer logic of the theory differ), but it is ω-consistent and,
consequently, has nice models extending the standard model. In a way, the two theories
mark two extremes amongst the prominent axiomatic theories of truth and by applying
our strategy to these two theories, we hope to get some feedback on how widely applicable
our strategy is and which theories of truth fit best with this kind of strategy.
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300 JOHANNES STERN
The paper is meant to be mostly self-contained and we will therefore recall the essentials
of the strategy we introduced in the first part of our investigation. Yet, we frequently omit
in-depth philosophical justification and interpretation of certain methodological decisions,
assumptions or theorems and refer the reader to the first paper of our investigation for this
purpose. We also refer the reader to our first paper for a presentation of our terminological
stipulations.
The paper is structured as follows. After quickly reminding the reader of the essentials
of the strategy we introduced in the first paper of our study, we apply the strategy to
the axiomatic theory of truth Kripke-Feferman and construct a family of theories, which
we label modal extensions of Kripke-Feferman. Similar to the investigation of the theory
Modal Friedman-Sheard in the first paper, we then discuss modal extensions of Kripke-
Feferman from three different perspectives.
We start by showing that modal extensions of Kripke-Feferman are adequate modal
theories from the perspective of modal operator logic, that is, these theories preserve
theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. We take this to
be a minimal criterion, an interesting modal theory, ought to fulfill. In the next section
we turn to semantic consideration and follow the outlines of work by Halbach & Welch
(2009) in developing modal fixed-point semantics, which combines Kripkes theory of
truth, that is, fixed-point semantics, with ideas of possible world semantics for modal
operator logic. By reflecting on (modal) fixed-point semantics a shortcoming of modal
extensions of Kripke-Feferman becomes apparent, which ultimately leads to an extension
of the language by a primitive possibility predicate and the development of the theory
Modal Kripke-Feferman. We then show that modal fixed-point semantics leaves us with
a nice method of constructing models for Modal Kripke-Feferman over the standard model.
Moreover, we show that Modal Kripke-Feferman axiomatizes modal fixed-point semantics
in the same way as the theory Kripke-Feferman can be said to axiomatize ordinary fixed-
point semantics.
As in the case of the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard we end our technical investigation
by discussing a proposal of Saul Kripke. Kripke suggested defining or understanding the
modal predicate (‘N ’) by the truth predicate modified by a modal operator (‘2T ’). We
show that, the modal predicate of the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman lends itself to the
understanding proposed by Kripke. That is, we show the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman
to be reducible to the theory Kripke-Feferman as formulated in a modal operator language.
The success of this reduction, which we label the “Kripke reduction”, provides a conceptual
insight into why the strategy of characterizing the modal predicate by appeal to its inter-
action with the truth predicate works so well: in applying this strategy we haven’t pushed
the deductive (and expressive) strength of our approach beyond the limits of the theory of
truth as formulated in a modal operator language and we allow for an understanding of the
modal predicate as defined by the truth predicate and a modal operator. As a consequence,
there remains only one potentially paradoxical concept, that is, the concept of truth. We
end our paper by an assessment of the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman and a comparison
of the two modal theories we have developed in the course of our study on “Modality and
Axiomatic Theories of Truth”.
§2. Kripke-Feferman and its modal extensions. We now start developing the modal
theory arising from the theory of truth Kripke-Feferman. To this end we recall the basic
idea of the strategy we developed in the first paper of our study on “Modality and
Axiomatic Theories of Truth”. The key feature of this strategy is to allow the introduction
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and elimination of the modal predicate only via the detour of the truth predicate. This
necessitates a reformulation of most modal principles and rules of modal operator logic
within the predicate setting. Roughly, a truth predicate needs to be introduced whenever
the standard formulation of a modal principle introduces or eliminates an occurrence of
the modality at stake. By introducing the truth predicate we avoid the (dis)quotation of
sentences which is one of the main sources of paradox. The strategy, therefore, has the
immediate benefit of rendering the modal notion paradox safe as long as the notion of
truth is.
If we apply the strategy in formulating counterparts to the principles of the modal
operator logic S5
(T ) 2φ → φ
(4) 2φ → 22φ
(E) ¬2φ → 2¬2φ
within the predicate setting, we see that each of these principles requires the introduction
of the truth predicate. We arrive at the following modal principles.
(T ′) ∀x(Sent(x) → (N x → T x))
(4′) ∀t (T N
.
t → N N
.
t)
(E ′) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t → N ¬
.
N
.
t).
Even though nothing like a truth predicate (or truth operator) is used in the formulation
of the operator principles, we think that the principles (T ′), (4′), and (E ′) express the
same modal properties as the operator principles, as the truth predicate should not make
any difference in this respect. Clearly, our strategy makes the modal theory dependent
on the theory of truth adopted and thus, the modal theories arising from different under-
lying theories of truth need to be tested and compared. As we have already mentioned,
in this paper we shall be interested in the modal theory arising from the theory of truth
Kripke-Feferman.
The modal theory will contain further modal axioms, which were also assumed in con-
structing the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. These axioms characterize the interaction of
the modal predicate with the logical vocabulary and are modeled after prominent principles
of first-order modal operator logic. Importantly, these axioms have the effect “rigidifying”
syntax theory, that is, of collapsing arithmetical truth into necessary truth. We want our
syntax theory to be rigid, because, we need to guarantee that the names of the syntactical
objects and operations always designate these objects and operations. Otherwise, we would
not be sure whether the modal axioms convey the meaning we intend them to convey.
If, e.g., a numeral codes in certain circumstances a closed term but in others a parenthesis,
then clearly the axioms (4′) and (E ′) would no longer express the modal properties that
we intend them to convey, but would be nonsensical instead.
In addition to these theory-unspecific axiom, which we already adopted in construct-
ing the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard, we introduce some theory-specific axioms. The
theory-specific axioms depend on the choice of the underlying theory of truth and may
appear plausible for one theory of truth but not for another one.
Finally, we adopt the following modified rule of necessitation
(T -Nec)
T φ
Nφ ,
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where φ is a sentence of the language. Obviously, (T -Nec) is just the rule of necessitation
known from modal operator logic modified to fit our general strategy. We now turn to the
discussion of the specific modal theory arising if the theory Kripke-Feferman is adopted.
We first recall the essentials of the theory Kripke-Feferman.
2.1. Kripke-Feferman. The axiomatic theory “Kripke-Feferman” was introduced by
Feferman during a talk in 1983 and was designed to capture Kripke’s purely semantic, that
is model-theoretic, theory of truth proof-theoretically. Feferman, however, did not publish
a written version of the theory until his 1991 “Reflecting on Incompleteness” (cf. Feferman
(1991)). In the mean time, Reinhardt (1985, 1986), Cantini (1989) and McGee (1991) had
investigated and discussed Feferman’s proposal in some detail and already used the now
common name ‘KF’. A thorough discussion of the theory can also be found in the more
recent work by Halbach (2011). We shall stick to Halbach in our presentation of the theory.
DEFINITION 2.1 (Kripke-Feferman). The theory KF consists of all axioms of PA in the
language LPAT and the following axioms
(KF1) ∀s∀t (T s =
.
t ↔ Val(s) = Val(t))
(KF2) ∀s∀t (T s 	=
.
t ↔ Val(s) 	= Val(t))
(KF3) ∀x(Sent(x) → (T ¬
.
¬
.
x ↔ T x))
(KF4) ∀x, y(Sent(x ∧
.
y) → (T (x ∧
.
y) ↔ T x ∧ T y))
(KF5) ∀x, y(Sent(x ∧
.
y) → (T ¬
.
(x ∧
.
y) ↔ T ¬
.
x ∨ T ¬
.
y))
(KF6) ∀v∀x(Sent(∀
.
vx) → (T (∀
.
vx) ↔ ∀t (T x(t/v))))
(KF7) ∀v∀x(Sent(∀
.
vx) → (T (¬
.
∀
.
vx) ↔ ∃t (T ¬
.
x(t/v))))
(KF8) ∀t (T T
.
t ↔ T (Val(t)))
(KF9) ∀t (T ¬
.
T
.
t ↔ T (¬
.
Val(t)) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
(KF10) ∀x(T x → Sent(x))
KF, in contrast to symmetric theories of truth like F S, is built on the idea of a positive
inductive definition. The axioms (KF8) and (KF9) are distinctive axioms of the theory KF.
THEOREM 2.2. KF is consistent.
Proof. For a detailed proof see Halbach (2011). We shall sketch the construction of
models for KF later in this section. 
Two facts about KF will be of some importance. First, KF proves the uniform Tarski
biconditionals without the truth predicate, and thus, UTB is a subtheory of KF. Second, the
principle of regularity, that is, the formalized substitution principle is derivable in KF.
FACT 2.3. The following are theorems of KF for all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA
(UTB) ∀t1, . . . , tn(T φ( t1
.
, . . . , tn
.
) ↔ φ(Val(t1), . . . , Val(tn)))
(RegT ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent(∀. vx) → (Val(s) = Val(t) → (T x(s/v) ↔ T x(t/v))))
In what is to come we employ the notion of a total and consistent sentence:
DEFINITION 2.4. Let φ be a sentence of LPAT (LPATN). We say that φ is a total and
consistent sentence relative to  iff
  ¬T φ ↔ T ¬φ
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In the same spirit we define the predicate tc(x) as follows:
tc(x) := ¬T x ↔ T ¬
.
x
As the truth predicate does not, in general, commute with negation not every sentence of
LPAT (LPATN) is total and consistent relative to KF. Moreover, if we required every sentence
to be total in KF, the resulting theory would be inconsistent.1 Although we cannot let
negation commute with the truth predicate we may consistently add the consistency axiom
(Cons) ∀x(Sent(x) → (T ¬
.
x → ¬T x))
to KF.2 The resulting theory will be called KFC. We shall need the following fact concern-
ing KFC.
FACT 2.5. The following are theorems of KFC:
(KT ) ∀x, y(Sent(x →. y) → (T x →. y → (T x → T y)))
(TT ) ∀t1, . . . , tn(T φ( t1
.
, . . . , tn
.
) → φ(Val(t1), . . . , Val(tn)))
for all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPAT.
Proof. See Halbach (2011, pp. 213f). 
2.2. Modal extensions of Kripke-Feferman. Finally we introduce the family of modal
extensions of KF. A theory is called a modal extension of KF if some basic modal princi-
ples are theorems of the theory. Besides some modal principles, we have already discussed
we adopt one KF-specific axiom
(RN) ∀t (T N
.
t ↔ NVal(t))
and one KF-specific rule
(TcR)
tc(φ)
tc(Nφ)
for all φ ∈ SentLPATN . (RN) has some intuitive appeal and more importantly it fits perfectly
with the theoretical outlines of KF which are to allow for the Tarski-biconditionals of all
atomic sentences. (TcR), in contrast, plays a rather instrumental role as although it is plausi-
ble from a theoretical perspective it seems hard to come up with some convincing intuitive
gloss for it. It says that if a sentence is total and consistent then so is its necessitation.
Phrased alternatively, the rule asserts that if a sentence φ is truth determinate, then so is the
necessitation of φ, Nφ.3
DEFINITION 2.6 (Modal Extension of KF). Let  be a theory of the language LPATN.
We call  a modal extension of KF iff  proves all axioms of KF in the language LPATN4
1 Cf. Halbach (2011, pp. 197/98).
2 Conversely, we may also consistently add the converse direction to KF, that is the completeness
axiom
(Comp) ∀x(Sent(x) → (¬T x → T ¬
.
x))
as long as we do not add (Cons).
3 See Feferman (2008) for the notion of truth determinateness.
4 Thereby we mean the axioms of KF where the syntactical predicates and functions symbol of
LPAT have been replaced by the corresponding expressions of LPATN. In general, as we pointed
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and, additionally, proves the following principles
(RegN ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent(∀vx. ) → (Val(s) = Val(t) → (N x(s/v) ↔ N x(t/v))))
(ND) ∀s∀t (Val(s) 	= Val(t) → N (s 	=
.
t))
(BF) ∀v∀x(Sent(∀
.
vx) → (∀t N x(t/v) → N ∀
.
vx))
(KN ) ∀x, y(Sent(x →. y) → (N (x →. y) → (N x → N y)))
(RN) ∀t (T N
.
t ↔ NVal(t))
Moreover,  is closed under the following rules
(T -Nec)
T φ
Nφ (TcR)
tc(φ)
tc(Nφ)
for all φ ∈ SentLPATN .
One modal extension of KF will be of special interest, namely the theory MKF− which
proves the modal principles (T ′). (4′) and (E ′).
DEFINITION 2.7 (MKF−). The smallest modal extension of KF, which has (T ′), (4′) and
(E ′) as theorems is called MKF−.
MKF− is consistent and, consequently, there are consistent modal extensions of KF.
THEOREM 2.8. MKF− is consistent.
Proof. The proof works similar to the consistency proof for MFS. Using the recursion
theorem we define a translation function g from LPATN to LPAT which translates the modal
predicate N by the truth predicate T and leaves the remaining vocabulary fixed. It is then
straightforward to show that
MKF−  φ ⇒ KFC  g(φ) 
COROLLARY 2.9. There exists a consistent modal extension  of KF.
For exactly the same reason as in the case of MFS the interpretation g will not be faithful.
We now move on to showing that syntax theory is rigid in any modal extension of KF.
Consequently, we are guaranteed that the modal axioms convey their intended meaning.
THEOREM 2.10. For all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA and any modal extension  of KF we have:
  ∀t1, . . . , tn(φ(Val(t1), . . . , Val(tn)) → Nφ( t1
.
, . . . , tn
.
))
Proof of Theorem 2.10. By induction over the positive built up of φ. See Stern (2012).

Before we show the adequacy of modal extensions of KF with respect to modal operator
logic, we prove the inconsistency of two possible strengthenings of MKF− as this will later
prove instructive.
out in “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I: Friedman-Sheard”, when we speak of a
theory (or axioms) in an extended language we always assume that the syntactical predicates and
functions symbols occurring in the axioms have been replaced by the corresponding expressions
of the extended language. We also assume the induction scheme to be extended to the new
language.
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THEOREM 2.11. Let  be a modal extension of KF with MKF− ⊆ . If  proves one of
the following
(i) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t ↔ ¬NVal(t))
(ii) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t ↔ ¬T N
.
t)
then  is inconsistent.
Proof. We first observe that due to (RN) (i) and (ii) are equivalent in any modal extension
. Therefore, we may use both principles in deriving the inconsistency result. By the
diagonal lemma we derive in PATN
(Nλ) l = ¬Nl
and we may reason as follows in MKF−
T Nl → T l (RN), (T ′)
→ T ¬Nl (Nλ), Subst
→ ¬T Nl (i i)
We may thus infer ¬T Nl, which by (RN) yields ¬Nl. Then, by (Nλ) and substitution,
we obtain ¬N¬Nl. By (E ′) we get ¬T ¬Nl and by (ii) T Nl. Contradiction.5 
2.3. Modal operator logic and modal extensions of KF . We now show that modal
extensions of KF and, in particular, MKF− are adequate modal theories from the perspec-
tive of modal operator logic. To this end we show that modal extensions of KF preserve
theoremhood with respect to modal operator logic modulo translation. The set up will be
exactly as in the first part of our study when we established the parallel result for the theory
MFS. That is, we consider a multimodal operator language LPA , where the sentences ofLPA act as the propositional atoms of the language. We let τ be a translation function that
commutes with the logical connectives and which translates φ (φ) by Nφ (T φ).6
The following lemma establishes that the Tarski biconditionals for all sentences in the
range of the translation function τ are provable in every modal extension of KF. This is the
central lemma for proving the adequacy of modal extensions of KF.
LEMMA 2.12. Let  be a modal extension of KF. Then for all φ ∈ LPA
  T τ(φ) ↔ τ(φ)
Proof. By induction on the positive complexity of φ one simultaneously shows
(†)   T τ(φ) ↔ τ(φ)
(‡)   tc(τ(φ))
5 Notice that for this derivation to work we need to assume that our language contains certain
function symbols, for otherwise we could not prove the strong diagonal lemma in PATN. We don’t
know whether the inconsistency result obtains when we dispense of these function symbols and
the strong diagonal lemma is no longer available. As, for example, Heck (2007) points out, there
are cases in which the strong diagonal lemma proves indispensable in deriving the inconsistency
of a theory.
6 We refer the reader to our first paper “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I: Friedman-
Sheard” for precise definitions of the language and the translation function at stake.
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We omit the details of this induction. For the case where φ := ¬2ψ we make essential use
of (‡) and (TcR). 
With Lemma 2.12 at our disposal, the desired adequacy result is easily obtained. We
show that MKF− preserves theoremhood with respect to the modal operator logic S5.7
More precisely, we show MKF− to preserve theoremhood with respect to the theory
resulting from PATN by addition of the modal principles of S5 axiomatizing the2-operator
and the Tarski biconditionals
(T r) φ ↔ φ
for the truth operator .
As in the first paper we call this theory PAS5.
THEOREM 2.13. Let  be a modal extension of KF extending MKF−. Then for all
φ ∈ LPA
PAS5  φ ⇒   τ(φ)
Proof. The theorem is established by an induction on the length of a proof in PAS5. The
base case follows from Lemma 2.12.8 The induction step follows by Lemma 2.12 and the
rule (T -Nec). 
The adequacy of MKF− depended almost entirely on Lemma 2.12, which is provable
for every modal extension of KF. This suggests that for a modal operator logic other than
S5 we may find a suitable modal extension of KF, which interprets the given logic. We now
turn to more semantic aspects of modal extensions of KF which will reveal a shortcoming
of MKF−. Ultimately this leads to an extension of MKF−. The adequacy of this extension
with respect to modal operator logic will be guaranteed, however, because by Theorem
2.13 every extension of MKF− will be adequate with respect to PAS5.
§3. Modal fixed-point semantics and MKF . We have already mentioned that KF is
meant to be an axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth, and as a matter of fact, the exten-
sions of the truth predicate we obtain by Kripke’s construction are suitable interpretations
of the truth predicate of KF. This suggests that there might be an interesting semantic story
to be told about modal extensions of KF. Before we tackle this question, we outline the
adequacy result for KF.
3.1. Fixed-point semantics and KF. Kripke’s idea was to work with a partially inter-
preted truth predicate, and thus, partial models of LPAT. Then, by using suitable evalua-
tion schemes he defines a monotone jump operation. Assuming standard set theory, the
monotonicity of the jump operation will guarantee the existence of fixed-points. These
fixed-points have some desirable properties and are considered as possible extensions
of the truth predicate by Kripke’s theory.9
Although, Kripke always remained neutral as to which evaluation scheme was prefer-
able, he used the so-called strong Kleene scheme in his initial proposal. This leads to the
following jump operation:
7 S5 is axiomatized by the modal principles (K ), (T ), (4) and (E), and the rule (Nec).
8 See the proof of the adequacy result of MFS in “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I:
Friedman-Sheard I” for more details.
9 Or, this is at least one way to understand Kripke. Another way is to understand him as advocating
the minimal fixed-point to be the desirable interpretation of the truth predicate.
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DEFINITION 3.1 (Strong Kleene Jump). Let (N, S) be a model for LPAT. The strong
Kleene jump  is an operation from sets of natural numbers to sets of natural numbers
such that
(S) = {#φ : (N, S) |SK φ}
Here |SK stands for the strong Kleene satisfaction relation.10 As we have already
pointed out  is a monotone operation which guarantees the existence of fixed-points,
i.e. the existence of sets S ⊆ ω for which (S) = S.
It turns out that the fixed-points of  are exactly the suitable interpretations of the truth
predicate of KF in the standard model:
THEOREM 3.2 (Feferman). For all S ⊆ ω
(S) = S ⇔ (N, S) | KF.
Proof. For a detailed proof we refer the reader to, for example McGee (1991) or Halbach
(2011). The left-to-right direction works by verifying that the axioms of KF hold in the
model. For the converse direction we need to verify that (S) = S. It suffices to prove that
#φ ∈ S ⇔ #φ ∈ (S),
which goes by induction over the positive built up of φ. As a sample case, we discuss
φ
.= ¬T t as this shall prove instructive. Assume #¬T t ∈ S, then (N, S) | T ¬T t and
therefore by (KF9) (N, S) | T ¬
.
t (for if ¬Sent(t) we are done). Then (¬
.
t)N ∈ S which
by definition of the Strong Kleene satisfaction relation and  is just #¬T t ∈ (S). 
As a corollary of this theorem we may show that if we consider only consistent exten-
sions of the truth predicate—where a set of (codes of) sentences S is consistent iff for no
sentence φ, #φ ∈ S and #¬φ ∈ S—the fixed-points of  are precisely the extensions of
the truth predicate of KFC:
COROLLARY 3.3. For all consistent S ⊆ ω:
(S) = S ⇔ (N, S) | KFC.
3.2. Modal Kripke-Feferman. The proof of Theorem 3.2 suggests that we will run
into trouble if we try to establish an adequacy result along these lines for modal extensions
of KF with respect to some modal fixed-point semantics yet to be defined. The problem is
that we have no axiom which allows us to deal with a formula of the form ¬Nt in proving
the right-to-left direction of a modified version of Theorem 3.2, that is there seems to be
no way to get from #¬Nt ∈ S to #¬Nt ∈ (S) and back. Notice that by Theorem 2.11
we may not add an axiom to MKF−that allows us to pull the negation out of the scope
of the truth predicate.
One might therefore suggest an axiom for the modal predicate which is modeled after
(KF9), namely
∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t ↔ N ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t))).
10 For a detailed definition of |SK see Halbach (2011). However, the definition can also be
extracted from our Definition 3.9.
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Whereas, this axiom might well do the job, it is utterly implausible on most modal readings
of the predicate ‘N ’, cf. “it is true that it is not necessary that Peter has brown hair if and
only if it is necessary that Peter does not have brown hair”.
However, if we replace the modal predicate on the right hand side of the above bi-
conditional by its dual, for example a possibility predicate, we obtain a principle which
is perfectly in line with the modal square of oppositions. Let ‘P’ be such a possibility
predicate and thus the dual of the predicate ‘N ’ read as ‘is necessary’. Applying our
suggestion, we arrive at the principle
∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t ↔ P ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
Fortunately, this strategy proves to be successful and if further suitable axioms for the
possibility predicate are added to MKF−, we may prove a modal version of Theorem 3.2.
Following these outlines we arrive at the theories B M K F and MKF. But first we define
the language LMKF.
DEFINITION 3.4. The language of LMKF is the language LPATN augmented by a further
one-place predicate ‘P’.
DEFINITION 3.5 (B M K F ). The theory B M K F is the smallest modal extension of KF
in the language LMKF (in the sense of Definition 2.6) which besides all axioms of (KF),
(RegN ), (ND), (BF), (KN ) and (RN) in the language LMKF contains the axioms:
(R P) ∀t (T P
.
t ↔ PV al(t))
(DN ) ∀t (T ¬
.
N
.
t ↔ P ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
(D P) ∀t (T ¬
.
P
.
t ↔ N ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
(RegP ) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent(∀vx. ) → (Val(s) = Val(t) → (Px(s/v) ↔ Px(t/v))))
B M K F is closed under (TcR) and (T -Nec). BMKFC is B M K F except that (Cons)
has been added to the axioms of the theory. The theory B X1, . . . , XnMKF (B X1, . . . ,
XnMKFC) is the theory B M K F (BMKFC) except that the principles X1 to Xn have been
added to the axioms of the theory.
Clearly, (R P), (D P), and (RegP ) are just the analogues of (RN), (DN ), and (RegN )
for the possibility predicate, and we take it that the former axioms are acceptable, if the
latter are.
DEFINITION 3.6 (MKF). The theory MKF (MKFC) is the theory BT′4′E ′MKF
(BT′4′E ′MKFC).
Before turning back to semantic questions and the relation between MKF and what we
call modal fixed-point semantics, we point to a general drawback of introducing a primi-
tive possibility predicate which is that we cannot expect the modal square of opposition,
that is, the interdefinability of the two modal predicates to hold within MKF. And indeed
the following principles will not be theorems of MKF or MKFC nor will they be valid in
the modal semantics to be defined:
∀x(Sent(x) → (N x ↔ ¬P ¬
.
x))
∀x(Sent(x) → (¬N x ↔ P ¬
.
x))
∀x(Sent(x) → (¬N ¬
.
x ↔ Px))
∀x(Sent(x) → (N ¬
.
x ↔ ¬Px))
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Very roughly the failure of the modal square of opposition may be seen as consequence
of the fact that “not true” (‘¬T ’) and “true that not” (‘T ¬
.
’) are not in general equivalent
in the case of KF. We shall come back to this shortcoming in the conclusion of the paper
but now turn toward modal fixed-point semantics.
3.3. Modal fixed-point semantics. The basic idea behind the semantics is to combine
Kripke’s fixed-point semantics (or theory of truth) with ideas from possible world seman-
tics for modal operator logic. To this end we introduce the notion of a modal frame and an
evaluation function. The evaluation function assigns a subset of ω to each possible world
which will serve as the interpretation of the truth predicate at that world. We then define a
modal strong Kleene jump on evaluation functions relative to a frame.11 Like the simple
strong Kleene jump the modal strong Kleene jump will have fixed-points and we may
obtain standard models for the theory BMKFC by appeal to these fixed-points.
We start giving the details of the semantics by introducing the notion of a frame, which
is exactly the same notion as in modal revision semantics we discussed in our first paper.
DEFINITION 3.7 (Frame, evaluation function). Let W 	= ∅ be a set of labeled natural
number structures and R ⊆ W × W a dyadic relation on W . Then F = 〈W, R〉 is called a
frame. A function f : W −→ P(ω) is called an evaluation function for a frame F. The set
of all evaluation functions of a frame F is denoted by ValF .
Next we define the notion of a model induced by a frame and an evaluation function
relative to a world. Notice that these models may serve as both strong Kleene models and
also classical models for LMKF.
DEFINITION 3.8 (Models for LMKF). Let F be a frame and f an evaluation function.
Then, Mw = 〈w, f (w), Yw, Zw〉 is a model of the language LMKF induced by F and f
at a world w, where f (w) is the extension of the truth predicate, Yw the extension of the
necessity predicate and Zw the extension of the possibility predicate with
Yw =
⋂
v∈[wR]
f (v)
Zw =
⋃
v∈[wR]
f (v).12
[wR] is short for {v ∈ W : wRv}.
Before we can define the modal strong Kleene jump on evaluation functions we need to
introduce the modal strong Kleene satisfaction relation:
DEFINITION 3.9 (Modal Strong Kleene Truth in a Model). We explain the notion of truth
in a model according to the strong Kleene scheme, |SK . Let Mw be a model induced by a
frame F and an evaluation function f at a world w in the sense of Definition 3.8:
(i) Mw |SK s = t ⇔ sN = tN
(ii) Mw |SK s 	= t ⇔ sN 	= tN
(iii) Mw |SK T t ⇔ tN ∈ f (w) & tN ∈ SentLPATN
(iv) Mw |SK ¬T t ⇔ (¬. t)N ∈ f (w) or tN ∈ SentLPATN
11 Basically our construction is a variant of the construction of Halbach & Welch (2009).
12 ⋂ is taken to be an operation on P(ω).
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(v) Mw |SK Nt ⇔ tN ∈ Yw & tN ∈ SentLPATN
(vi) Mw |SK ¬Nt ⇔ (¬. t)N ∈ Zw or tN ∈ SentLPATN
(viii) Mw |SK Pt ⇔ tN ∈ Zw & tN ∈ SentLPATN
(ix) Mw |SK ¬Pt ⇔ (¬. t)N ∈ Yw or tN ∈ SentLPATN
(x) Mw |SK ¬¬ψ ⇔ Mw |SK ψ
(xi) Mw |SK ψ ∧ χ ⇔ (Mw |SK ψ and Mw |SK χ)
(xii) Mw |SK ¬(ψ ∧ χ) ⇔ (Mw |SK ¬ψ or Mw |SK ¬χ)
(xiii) Mw |SK ∀xψ ⇔ for all n ∈ ω(Mw |SK ψ(n/x))
(xiv) Mw |SK ¬∀xψ ⇔ there exists an n ∈ ω(Mw |SK ψ(n/x))
tN is the interpretation of a term t in the standard model and, SentLPAT denotes the set of
Gödel numbers of sentences and SentLPAT its complement. If Mw | φ we say that φ is true
in the model induced by F and f at w. If it is important to keep track of the frame and the
evaluation function, we write F, w | fSK φ instead of Mw |SK φ. We say that φ is true in
the model induced by F and f , F, f |SK , if and only if, ∀w ∈ W (F, w | fSK ).
Classical truth in a LMKF-model is defined as one would expect. We also use the same
notation as for modal strong Kleene truth in a model but drop the ‘SK ’ subscript from the
double turnstyle denoting the satisfaction relation. Next we define the modal strong Kleene
jump.
DEFINITION 3.10 (Modal Strong Kleene Jump). Let F be a frame and ValF the set of
evaluation functions of F. The modal Strong Kleene jump F is an operation on ValF
relative to F such that for all w ∈ W
[F ( f )](w) = {#φ : F, w | fSK φ}.
Importantly, the modal Strong Kleene jump is again a monotone operation:
LEMMA 3.11 (Monotonicity). Let F be a frame. The jump F is a monotone operation
on ValF , that is, for all f, g ∈ ValF :
f ≤ g ⇒ F ( f ) ≤ F (g),
where f ≤ g :⇔ ∀w ∈ W ( f (w) ⊆ g(w)).
Proof. Clearly for all evaluation functions f , g with f (w) ⊆ g(w) for all w ∈ W we
have [F ( f )](w) ⊆ [F (g)](w) for all w ∈ W and thus F ( f ) ≤ F (g). 
The monotonicity of F implies, assuming standard set theory like Z F , the existence
of fixed-points, that is the existence of an evaluation function f ∈ ValF such that,
F ( f ) = f.
With all this at hand, we can give an adequacy result for BMKFC, but not for B M K F . The
reason for this is that throughout we have assumed the modal axiom (KN ) to be a theorem
of any modal extension of KF and, especially, of B M K F . However, for (KN ) to be valid
in modal fixed-point semantics we must only consider consistent extensions of the truth
predicate. Indeed, this was the main reason why we could interpret the modal predicate of
modal extensions of KF as the truth predicate of KFC but not as the truth predicate of KF
simpliciter. Consequently, if we wish to provide a more general adequacy result, we needed
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to drop (KN ) from the axioms of B M K F . As we take (KN ) to be a constitutive modal
axiom we shall not pursue this line any further.
In what is to come, we frequently use the following lemma that links strong Kleene truth
in a model to the classical notion:
LEMMA 3.12. Let F be a frame and f ∈ ValF an evaluation function. Then, for all
t ∈ CtermsLMKF
(i) F, w | fSK Nt ⇔ F, w | f N t
(ii) F, w | fSK ¬Nt ⇔ F, w | f P ¬. t
(iii) F, w | fSK Pt ⇔ F, w | f Pt
(iv) F, w | fSK ¬Pt ⇔ F, w | f N ¬. t.
Proof. Immediate from Definitions 3.8 and 3.9. 
We call an evaluation function f consistent, if for all w, f (w) is consistent. BMKFC
axiomatizes modal fixed-point semantics with respect to consistent evaluation functions.
THEOREM 3.13. For all frames F and all consistent evaluation functions f ∈ ValF
F ( f ) = f ⇔ F, f | BMKFC
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, we need to show that all theorems of BMKFC are
true in the model induced by the frame F and the evaluation function f at an arbitrary
world w. This is a standard induction on the length of a proof in BMKFC which we shall
omit.
For the converse direction, we assume ∀w(F, w | f BMKFC) and need to show that
f = F ( f ). To this end we show for an arbitrary world w that [F ( f )](w) = f (w),
which we do by induction on the positive built up of a sentence φ, since due to (KF10) we
know that only sentences are in f (w). Again this induction proves to be routine and we
only discuss the cases Nt and ¬Nt . In particular, the case ¬Nt proves to be instructive as it
nicely illustrates the importance of the primitive possibility predicate for our construction.
• φ .= Nt
#Nt ∈ f (w) ⇔ F, w | f T Nt Def. 3.8
⇔ F, w | f N t (RN)
⇔ F, w | fSK Nt Lemma 3.12
⇔ #Nt ∈ [F ( f )](w) Def. 3.10
• φ .= ¬Nt
#¬Nt ∈ f (w) ⇔ F, w | f T ¬Nt Def. 3.8
⇔ F, w | f P ¬
.
t (DN )
⇔ F, w | fSK ¬Nt Lemma 3.12
⇔ #¬Nt ∈ [F ( f )](w) Def. 3.10
The atomic cases dealing with the possibility predicate work exactly parallel to the cases of
the necessity predicate and the remaining cases may be found in any detailed presentation
of the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
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COROLLARY 3.14. BMKFC (B M K F) is consistent.
By Theorem 3.13 we have established a nice connection between BMKFC and modal
fixed-point semantics, but we still lack such a connection for MKFC. Yet, we have all the
prerequisites for establishing an adequacy result for MKFC with respect to modal fixed-
point semantics. We just need to restrict the class of modal frames we consider since the
modal axioms (T ′), (4′), and (E ′) are only guaranteed to be true on frames that have certain
properties. We state the connections between the modal axioms and the frame properties
after introducing some terminology.
DEFINITION 3.15. Let F be a frame and φ ∈ SentLMKF . We write F | φ iff for all
consistent evaluation functions f with F ( f ) = f we have F, f | φ.
THEOREM 3.16. Let F = 〈W, R〉 be a frame. Then
(i) R is reflexive ⇔ F | BT′MKFC
(ii) R is transitive ⇔ F | B4′MKFC
(iii) R is Euclidean ⇔ F | BE′MKFC.
Sketch of a proof. The proof is identical to the parallel result for modal revision se-
mantics we discussed in the prequel to this paper and we refer the reader to this paper for
further detail. The most important observation for the proof is that a truth teller sentence is
either in the extension of the truth predicate at a world from the start on or it will never be
in the extension of the truth predicate at that world. 
COROLLARY 3.17. Let F = 〈W, R〉 be a frame. Then,
R is an equiv. relation ⇔ F | MKFC
COROLLARY 3.18. MKFC (M K F) is consistent.
This ends our discussion of modal fixed-point semantics and its connection to MKF or
rather to MKFC.
§4. The “Kripke reduction” and MKF . Eventually, we turn our focus toward the
so-called “Kripke reduction”, that is, the idea of understanding the modal predicate(s) of
MKF as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator. Kripke originally proposed to
understand the necessity predicate (‘N ’) as the complex predicate ‘is necessarily true’
(‘2T ’). Since Kripke did not envisage the introduction of a primitive possibility predicate
he remained mute on how this predicate ought to be defined in terms of a truth predicate
and a modal operator. However, we may understand the possibility predicate as ‘is possibly
true’ (‘3T ′), that is as a complex predicate obtained by modifying a truth predicate by a
possibility operator. In our framework, the question of whether the modal predicates of
MKF lend themselves to an understanding along the lines of the “Kripke reduction” trans-
forms into the question of whether MKF can be reduced to some theory of truth formulated
in the language L2PAT, that is LPAT augmented by a modal operator 2,13 assuming some
reasonable underlying modal logic. Indeed, MKF should not be reduced to any theory of
truth but to KF formulated in L2PAT for otherwise the “truth” predicate of the target theory
13 All formation rules of L2PAT are standard.
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would not be a truth predicate in the sense of MKF and, arguably, we would have failed to
“reduce” the modal predicate to the truth predicate modified by the modal operator.
Moreover, as in the previous section we need to assume our underlying truth predicate
to be consistent as otherwise it seems unlikely that the (intended) translation of KN , that is
∀x, y(SentLM K F (x →. y) → (2T (x →. y) → (2T x → 2T y)))
will be derivable in KF as formulated in L2PAT. If we assume KFC as our underlying theory
of truth, this principle will follow from (KT ) and the principles of modal operator logic
(Nec) and (K ). But, as pointed out, KT is not a theorem of KF, and thus, we cannot
use this derivation, if we assume only KF. Correspondingly, we take the underlying target
theory to be an extension of KFC, which suggests carrying out the reduction for MKFC
rather than for MKF.
If we formulate KFC in L2PAT we need to supplement the theory KFC by an axiom
describing the interaction of the truth predicate and the modal operator. Indeed, we need
two axioms, one for the positive and one for the negative modal case, as KF is built on
the idea of a positive inductive definition. The resulting extension of KFC will be called
KFC2:
DEFINITION 4.1 (KFC2). Let L2PAT be LPAT augmented by a modal operator. The theory
KFC2 consists of all axioms of KFC in the language L2PAT together with the following
principles
(IA2) ∀x(Sent(x) → (T 2
.
x ↔ 2T x))
(IA3) ∀x(Sent(x) → (T ¬
.
2
.
x ↔ 3T ¬
.
x))
Throughout we assume 3φ to be a notational abbreviation of, ¬2¬φ.14
KFC2 gives us no information concerning the modal properties of the 2-operator and,
again, the set of theorems of KFC2 will depend on the modal logic assumed. Since MKF
is meant to capture a modal notion related to the one characterized by the modal operator
logic S5 we shall assume the underlying modal operator logic to be QS5, that is S5 in
standard first-order logic together with the so-called principles “necessity of distinctness”
and the “Barcan formula”
(ND2) ∀x, y(x 	= y → 2x 	= y)
(BF2) ∀x2φ → 2∀xφ
We write KFC2 S φ iff φ is derivable in KFC2 assuming the modal operator logic S.
In particular we write KFC2 QS5 φ iff φ is derivable in KFC2 assuming the underlying
modal logic to be QS5.
Importantly, we may already derive the rigidity of syntax assuming QK—the basic
modal system (K ) in standard first-order logic together with (ND2) and (BF2):
LEMMA 4.2. For all φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LPA
KFC2 QK ∀x1, . . . , xn(φ(x1, . . . , xn) → 2φ(x1, . . . , xn))
Proof. By induction over the positive built up of φ. 
14 KFC2 is consistent independent of the (consistent) modal operator logic assumed for we
can interpret KFC2 in KFC if the latter is consistent. Depending on the modal logic under
consideration a formula 2φ is either interpreted by φ or by s = s for some closed term s.
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After having specified the target theory of the “Kripke-reduction” we turn our attention
toward the translation function we use in carrying out the reduction. We use a slight mod-
ification of the translation function employed by Halbach & Welch (2009). As mentioned,
we will translate ‘N ’ to 2T ’ and ‘P’ to ‘¬2¬T ’, but leave the remaining vocabulary
fixed. We appeal to the recursion theorem to establish the existence of such a translation
function:
LEMMA 4.3 (Halbach and Welch). There is a translation function η : LMKF −→ L2PAT
with the following properties
η(φ) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ , if φ .= (s = t)
Tη•(s) , if φ .= T s, for some term s
2Tη•(s) , if φ .= Ns, for some term s
¬2¬Tη•(s) , if φ .= Ps, for some term s
¬η(ψ) , if φ .= ¬ψ
η(ψ) ∧ η(χ) , if φ .= ψ ∧ χ
∀xη(ψ) , if φ .= ∀xψ
0 , if otherwise
where η• represents η in PA.
We have all the prerequisites for stating our main theorem:
THEOREM 4.4. Let η be a translation function as specified in Lemma 4.3. Then for all
φ ∈ LPATN:
MKFC  φ ⇒ KFC2 QS5 η(φ)
For the proof of Theorem 4.4 we make crucial use of the following lemma:
LEMMA 4.5. Let QS5 be the underlying modal logic. Then the following are theorems
of K F2:
(i) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent(∀vx
.
) → (Val(s) = Val(t) → (2T x(t/v) ↔ 2T x(s/v))))
(ii) ∀x, v, s, t (Sent(∀vx
.
) → (Val(s) = Val(t) → (3T x(t/v) ↔ 3T x(s/v))))
(iii) ∀s, t (Val(s) 	= Val(t) → 2T s 	=
.
t)
(iv) ∀x, v(Sent(∀
.
vx) → (∀t2T x(t/v) → 2T ∀
.
vx))
(v) ∀x, y(Sent(x →
.
y) → (2T (x →
.
y) → (2T x → 2T y)))
(vi) ∀t (T 2
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T Val(t))
(vii) ∀t (T 3
.
T
.
t ↔ 3T Val(t))
(viii) ∀t (T ¬
.
2
.
T t ↔ 3T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
(ix) ∀t (T ¬
.
3
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)))
(x) ∀x(Sent(x) → (2T x → T x))
(xi) ∀t (T 2
.
T
.
t → 2T 2
.
T
.
t)
(xii) ∀t (T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t → 2T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t)
Proof. (i) By induction on the positive complexity of a formula of L2PAT we derive
(RegT ), then use (Nec) and Lemma 4.2. (ii) similar to item (i). (iii), (iv), and (v) follow,
respectively, from (KF2), (KF6) and (KT ) and the modal properties of QK and Lemma
4.2; (vi) by (IA2), (KF8), (Nec), (K ) and Lemma 4.2; (vii) as item (vi) but using (IA3)
and (KF2) instead of (IA2). (x) is a straightforward consequence of the modal axiom (T ).
It remains to show (viii), (ix), (xi), and (xii). We reason as follows—again note that φ(t)
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is short for Cterm(x) → φ(x) and that if we apply (Nec) due to (K ) and Lemma 4.2 we
may derive Cterm(x) → 2φ(x):
(viii) We start with an instance of (IA3):
1. T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t ↔ 3T ¬
.
T
.
t (IA3)
2. 3T ¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 3T ¬
.
Val(t)t ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)) (KF9), (Nec), (K ), Lemma 4.2
3. T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t ↔ 3T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)) 1, 2
4. ∀t (T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t ↔ 3T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t))) 3
(ix) We first observe that T ¬
.
3
.
T
.
t is only an abbreviation of T ¬
.
¬
.
2
.
¬
.
T
.
t
1. T ¬
.
¬
.
2
.
¬
.
T
.
t ↔ T 2
.
¬
.
T
.
t (KF2)
2. T 2
.
¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
T
.
t (IA2)
3. 2T ¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)) (KF9), (Nec), (K ), Lemma 4.2
4. T ¬
.
¬
.
2
.
¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t)) 1, 2, 3
5. ∀t (T ¬
.
¬
.
2
.
¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
Val(t) ∨ ¬Sent(Val(t))) 4
(xi) We start with an instance of the modal axiom (4):
1. 2T T
.
t → 22T T
.
t (4)
2. 2T T
.
t ↔ T 2
.
T
.
t (IA2)
3. 22T T
.
t ↔ 2T 2
.
T
.
t 2, (Nec), (K ), Lemma 4.2
4. T 2
.
T
.
t → 2T 2
.
T
.
t 1, 2, 3
5. ∀t (T 2
.
T
.
t → 2T 2
.
T
.
t) 4
(xii) The proof starts by an instance of the modal axiom (E):
1. 3T ¬
.
T
.
t → 23T ¬
.
T
.
t (E)
2. 3T ¬
.
T
.
t ↔ T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t (IA3)
3. 23T ¬
.
T
.
t ↔ 2T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t (Nec), (K ), Lemma 4.2
4. T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t → 2T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t 1, 2, 3
5. ∀t (T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t → 2T ¬
.
2
.
T
.
t) 4

Before we start the proof of the main theorem we state some important properties
of η that we can prove in PATN and thus in KFC2.
LEMMA 4.6. The following is provable in PATN, and thus in KFC2:
(i) ∀x(SentLMKF(x) → SentL2PAT(η•(x)))
(ii) ∀x(SentLPA(x) → η•(x) = x)
Proof. By formalizing the properties of η. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By a routine induction over the length of a proof in MKFC
assuming QS5. The start of the induction is established by Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. For the
induction step we have to deal with two cases for a sentence may be derived by (T -Nec) or
(TcR). In the case of (T -Nec) we may assume that KFC2 QS5 η(T φ). By necessitation
we then infer KFC2 QS5 2η(T φ) but since ρ(Nφ) .= 2η(T φ) this ends the case
of (T -Nec).
For (TcR) we assume P K F2 QS5 η(tc(φ)), that is P K F2 QS5 T ¬η(φ) ↔
¬T η(φ). Then, by (KF8) and (KF9), P K F2 QS5 T ¬. T η(φ) ↔ ¬T T η(φ)
and by (Nec), (K ) and propositional logic P K F2 QS5 3T ¬. T η(φ) ↔ ¬2T T
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η(φ). Using (IA2) and (IA3) we derive the desired P K F2 QS5 T ¬. 2T η(φ)
↔ ¬T 2T η(φ). 
With the proof of this result we end our discussion of the “Kripke reduction” and thereby
the third and last theme of our investigation. To conclude, we shall sum up our results,
compare the two modal theories MFS and MKF and give a quick assessment of our general
strategy.
§5. Conclusion. In this paper we tested a strategy for developing modal theories over
theories of truth that we presented in some detail in a prequel to this paper. To this end,
we applied the strategy to the axiomatic theory of truth KF. Overall the modal theory
we constructed over KF was fairly attractive.15 It preserves theoremhood with respect
to modal operator logic and, therefore, may be considered as an adequate modal theory
from the perspective of modal operator logic. We also showed that MKFC can be viewed
as an axiomatization of modal fixed-point semantics. That is, MKFC stands in the same
relation to modal fixed-point semantics as KF stands to simple fixed-point semantics,
that is, Kripke’s theory of truth. KF is often taken to be an axiomatization of Kripke’s
theory of truth. We take this result to be a strong point in favor of the theory MKFC
for, arguably, the fact that KF axiomatizes Kripke’s theory of truth is one reason for the
popularity of KF amongst theorists of truth. Finally, the Kripke reduction gives us a nice
explanation of the success of our strategy. Since, the modal predicate can be understood as
a truth predicate modified by a modal operator, there remains just one paradoxical concept,
namely the concept of truth. This is also reflected within the semantic construction, since
the interpretation of the modal predicates is obtained by quantifying over the interpretations
of the truth predicate.
However, when we turned to (modal) fixed-point semantics a less-than-ideal feature of
the theory of modality arising from KF became apparent. In order to establish the adequacy
of MKFC with respect to modal fixed-point semantics, we had to introduce a primitive
possibility predicate for which the modal square of opposition breaks down. The reason
for this shortfall may be located in the divergence of the inner and outer logic of KF, that
is, more precisely, in the fact that the truth predicate of KF does not freely commute with
negation. Indeed, this fact is nicely illustrated by the properties of our translation function
η of Lemma 4.3 which translates ‘Pφ’ and ‘Nφ’ to ’3T η(φ)’ and ‘2T η(φ)’,
respectively. Consequently, whereas ‘¬N¬φ’ is translated to ‘¬2T ¬η(φ)’ the trans-
lation of ‘Pφ’ will be the formula ‘¬2¬T η(φ)’, and since the truth predicate of KF
does not commute freely with negation, these formulas will not, in general, be equivalent.
To the rescue of MKF (MKFC) one should point out that the modal square of opposition
will be provable for total and consistent sentences, and thus in particular for all the sen-
tences modal operator logic is concerned with.16 Similarly, the modal square of opposition
15 The attentive reader may complain that we haven’t considered the effects of adding contingent
vocabulary to the language in testing our strategy and in formulating the theory MKF. Contingent
vocabulary, however, can be dealt with along the lines we have sketched out in the first paper of
our investigation.
16 Actually, this claim is correct only if the theories MKF (MKFC) are supplemented by the
following rule for the possibility predicate:
tc(φ)
tc(Pφ) .
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will be valid for all grounded sentences within modal fixed-point semantics. The modal
predicates of MKF (MKFC), therefore, behave just like the “ordinary” notions of necessity
and possibility on the “normal” sentences but show deviant behavior on the ungrounded
sentences. Yet, bearing Kripke’s theory of truth in mind this is just what one would expect
as within Kripke’s theory the truth predicate behaves in the intuitive way on the grounded
sentences within Kripke’s theory but shows deviant behavior on the ungrounded ones.
Nonetheless, the introduction of a primitive possibility predicate does not count as an
attractive feature of a theory of modality and in formulating the theory Modal Friedman-
Sheard which we investigated in “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I”, we could
dispense with the introduction of a such a primitive possibility predicate. Friedman-Sheard,
the theory of truth underlying Modal Friedman-Sheard, is a symmetric theory of truth. The
truth predicate commutes with negation, and is closed under the rules of T -introduction
and T -elimination. This guarantees that the inner and the outer logic are identical. In the
case of Friedman-Sheard the inner and the outer logic are both are classical. Our findings
suggest that symmetric theories of truth are better suited for the present strategy, which
intimately binds the modal theory to the theory of truth assumed. This view is supported by
our explanation of the failure of the modal square opposition using the Kripke reduction:
as long as the truth predicate commutes with negation the necessity and the possibility
predicate will be interdefinable. As the modal predicates of both modal theories we have
presented in the course of our investigation may be understood along the lines of Kripke’s
proposal, this illustration seems to generalize. Over symmetric theories of truth one modal
predicate suffices, but if the underlying theory of truth is nonsymmetric the introduction
of a further primitive modal predicate might be required. While these observations suggest
that the strategy we developed is particularly well suited for symmetric theories of truth
proponents of Kripke-Feferman should not dismiss MKF because of the primitive possi-
bility predicate we have assumed. Rather, we take it that the primitive possibility predicate
should be considered as nothing but a symptom of the slightly deviant characteristics of
the truth predicate of KF.
Summing up, our strategy of avoiding introduction and elimination of the modal pred-
icate independently of the truth predicate has proven rather successful since the modal
theories “Modal Friedman-Sheard” and “Modal Kripke-Feferman” can be viewed as apt
theories of modality, if the underlying theories of truth are accepted. Moreover, the modal
predicate was axiomatized by appeal to, arguably, rather plausible modal principles and
without resorting to some unprincipled (or principled) typing restriction or by limiting the
expressive power of the language and theory. We have, thus, provided a predicate approach
to modality without appeal to any syntactic trickery or typing restriction.
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